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Abstract
In May 2017, the government of Brazil enacted a new immigration law,
replacing a statute introduced in 1980 during the country’s military
dictatorship with progressive legislation that advances human rights
principles and adopts innovative approaches to migration management.
One of the most notable features of the new law is its explicit rejection of
the criminalization of migration, and its promotion of efforts to regularize
undocumented migrants. Although the law itself is new, the values
embedded in the law reflect recent trends in Brazilian immigration policy,
which has embraced legalization, and has generally resisted the use of
criminal law to punish unauthorized migration. Indeed, in Brazil, an
initial unlawful entry does not carry criminal consequences, and at the
level of society, public discourse and policy debates display minimal
concern regarding this act. This posture is especially intriguing, given
Brazil’s otherwise aggressive focus on criminality and incarceration.
This paper seeks to understand the circumstances that have led to this
non-embrace of the criminalization of migration, and in particular, the
scarce use of criminal law tools to punish and deter unlawful entry and
related acts. The paper explores how a combination of historical factors,
present-day conditions, and political forces have largely suppressed
practices that dominate in the United States and in parts of Europe.
Contemporary Brazilian immigration policies have generally adopted
norms of forgiveness and integration—values buoyed by broader
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geopolitical interests that the Brazilian government has pursued in recent
times. Additional factors unique to Brazil undergird the current approach,
including Brazil’s history of immigration, current migration flows, and
criminal justice priorities. The paper concludes with some cautionary
notes, suggesting that the disavowal of criminalization in Brazil may be
ephemeral in Brazil’s volatile political climate, and may mask other
conditions that create structural vulnerability for noncitizens in the
country.
I. INTRODUCTION
The world today is experiencing unprecedented levels of global migration, with
tens of millions of persons living outside of their country of nationality or displaced
from their homes. 1 A number of factors have contributed to these migration flows,
including entrenched, violent conflicts, varying forms of persecution, climate
change, economic and food insecurity, and efforts at family reunification. In recent
times, some migrant-receiving countries—including the United States and some
countries in Europe—have sought to enhance immigration enforcement, expel
unauthorized individuals, and curb the entry of certain noncitizens.2 Among the key
narratives informing this trend are concerns about criminality among migrants,3 and
the related concern that migrants—particularly those from certain countries or of
certain religious or ethnic backgrounds—pose a threat to national security.4 In some
jurisdictions—most notably the United States—these narratives build upon a
decades-long trend towards criminalizing migrants, as reflected in a range of wellestablished practices.5
Scholars have explored whether restrictiveness in migration policy is a growing
and inexorable trend, particularly in an age of global terrorism and the retrenchment
of nationalism. While opinions on this question are mixed, 6 there is consensus
regarding the growing criminalization of irregular migrants, including the
1

UNHCR, Figures at a Glance, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.

2

See, e.g., Joanna Parkin, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: A State-of-the-Art of
the Academic Literature and Research, CEPS PAPER IN LIBERTY & SECURITY No. 61 (Oct. 2013), at 7–
8 (describing restrictive measures introduced in Europe).
3
See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration
Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 701–02 (2016).
4
Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1850–57 (2007).
5

CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 9–15 (2015).

6
See generally Hein de Haas et al., Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection? The
Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies, INT’L MIGRATION REV. (2016) (arguing that although there
appears to be a global trend towards more restrictive migration policies, a closer examination of 45
countries reveals a mixed picture).
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codification and prosecution of illegal entry and related offenses in the United States
and Europe. 7 There has been comparatively less study, however, regarding the
criminalization of migration in the Global South. 8 This scholarly attention is critical,
given that some of these countries shoulder a disproportionate burden of the global
migration flows.9 Additionally, as more countries in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia embrace their role as migrant-receiving countries, their policies and practices
merit scrutiny, both for their own sake and as possible counter-examples to what is
occurring in the United States and Europe.10
This article examines laws and policies relating to unlawful entry and related
criminal offenses in one such country: Brazil. Brazil has an extensive history of
receiving international migrants, and continues to receive economic migrants and
refugees from across the globe. 11 Brazil is also a country where race and class
divisions are deeply embedded in societal structures, and where concerns regarding
criminality in society are heightened and have led to a burgeoning prison
population.12 In other words, on paper, Brazil seems to be fertile ground for
embracing criminal-immigration intersections. As this article explores, however,
the criminalization and prosecution of immigration-related offenses—in particular,
unlawful entry—simply has not taken root in Brazil. In fact, the contrary is arguably
true, as exemplified by the passage of a new immigration law in May 2017, which
explicitly embraces the “non-criminalization of migration” as a principle of
Brazilian immigration policy.13
7
Id. at 25 (“Irregular migrants are the only category for which policies have almost
consistently moved into a more restrictive direction over the entire post-WWII period.”).
8
See, e.g., Anugerah Rizki Akbari, Explaining Crimmigration in Indonesia: A Discourse of
the Fight Against People Smuggling, Irregular Migration Control, and Symbolic Criminalization, 3
INDONESIA L. REV. 276, 279 (2015) (“discussion concerning [crimmigration in places outside the U.S.
and Europe] remains dark”).
9
UNHCR, supra note 1 (noting that the “top hosting countries” for displaced persons are
Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Uganda, and Ethiopia).
10
Although not specifically focused on criminalization, some scholars have begun to draw
distinctions between migration policies in South America, as compared to the U.S. and Europe. See
generally Diego Acosta Arcarazo & Luisa Feline Freier, Turning the Immigration Policy Paradox
Upside Down? Populist Liberalism and Discursive Gaps in South America, 43 INT’L MIGRATION REV.
659 (2014).
11
JEFFREY LESSER, IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BRAZIL, 1808 TO THE
PRESENT (2013) (describing historical migration flows into Brazil); Neide Lopes Patarra, Migrações
Internacionais de e para o Brasil Contemporâneo: Volumes, Fluxos, Significados e Políticas, 19 SÃO
PAULO EM PERSPECTIVA 23, 27–31 (2005) (describing more recent migration trends).
12
Andreia Verdélio, Com 726 mil presos, Brasil tem terceira maior população carcerária do
mundo, EBC AGÊNCIA BRASIL (Aug. 12, 2017), http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/201712/populacao-carceraria-do-brasil-sobe-de-622202-para-726712-pessoas (noting that Brazil now has
the third largest prison population in the world, behind the United States and China).
13

Lei No. 13,445 de 24 de Maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017.
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The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly sketch
how concern about undocumented migration, and the prosecution of unlawful entry,
has grown in the United States and elsewhere. I then describe the landscape of laws
and practices in Brazil relating to such criminal offenses, noting the conspicuous
absence of a provision that criminalizes unlawful entry without other aggravating
factors, and the infrequent use of comparable provisions in the Brazilian criminal
code. In Part III, I suggest different ways to understand Brazil’s seeming rejection
of the criminalization of migration, examining historical, demographic, political,
and other factors. I conclude in Part IV with some observations and reflections about
the normative significance of these policies at the global level, along with some
cautionary notes about the possible impermanence of Brazil’s current approach.
II. CRIMINALIZING UNLAWFUL ENTRY: THEORY AND COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
The criminalization of migration is a complex phenomenon that takes many
different forms across diverse jurisdictions. The most common manifestations
include: (1) the criminalization of unlawful entry and/or other migration-related acts,
such as unlawful re-entry, assisting others to enter unlawfully, or harboring; (2) the
imposition of immigration-related consequences (such as deportation) for criminal
conviction or even arrests; (3) the contemporary phenomenon of immigration
detention, including practices that are nominally “civil detention” but are
indistinguishable from criminal incarceration; and (4) the blurring of lines between
the functions of local police and immigration officers, including the delegation of
immigration-related functions to local police. 14 This article focuses primarily on the
first of these, and highlights some competing theoretical approaches, along with
distinct laws and policies adopted in the United States, Europe, and Brazil. As
described more fully below, in the context of increased global scrutiny of irregular
migration, Brazil has charted a unique course by favoring regularization and safe
migration over criminalization. To provide relevant context, other criminalimmigration intersections in Brazil are also briefly described below.
A. Theoretical Considerations
In a world that remains defined by nation-states, and thus national borders and
immigration control, there are two primary approaches to unlawful entry: to treat it
as an administrative violation, with a corresponding immigration law sanction, or to
criminalize the act, and therefore possibly jail or fine violators.
If one separates out the current political context, it is difficult to argue that the
act of crossing a border should intrinsically be treated as a crime. Most unauthorized
migration is either forced migration, economic migration, or some combination
thereof, which suggests that most border-crossers would not have the intent to
14

GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 5.
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perpetrate violence or other kinds of harm upon the United States. This begs the
question of whether criminal law, which at its core is designed to address socially
undesirable behavior, should be used to regulate the movement of persons across
national boundaries.15 The use of criminal law sanctions is especially notable given
the economic and situational precarity of many individuals who choose to enter other
countries without authorization. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that most of
these individuals would have sought a legitimate visa to enter their destination
country, if they had the means of doing so and they qualified under an existing visa
category.16 Finally, criminalization of unlawful entry seems to run counter to the
longer arc of globalization, which is causing the world to become increasingly
interdependent economically, and is leading to frequent movements across
borders.17
Yet basic tenets of criminology explain how an act such as unlawful entry can
be converted into a crime, simply by establishing a rule, enforcing the law, and
imposing a penalty. The decision to treat a particular act as a crime is often based
on societal consensus, but it can also reflect the will of a politically powerful subset
of the population, which seeks to exert or maintain control over others.18 As Ben
Bowling observed, “What is important is who feels harmed by the act and the power
of those defining the act as criminal in comparison with those against whom the rule
is enforced.”19 This is not to suggest that border control is without justification, as
the entry of noncitizens can certainly carry economic, social, and even securityrelated consequences. From a regulatory perspective, however, the question is
whether the imposition of a criminal penalty is needed to accomplish specific state
objectives, or whether an administrative sanction or even no sanction would suffice.
In answering this question, one must disentangle distinct state objectives relating to
migrants, which at times coincide, but can also coexist in tension. 20
15

Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 367, 379 (2006).
Daniel Martinez & Jeremy Slack, What Part of “Illegal” Don’t You Understand? The Social
Consequences of Criminalizing Unauthorized Mexican Migrants in the United States, 22 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 535, 546.
16

17
Ben Bowling, Border Work, Criminology, and the Crimmigration Control Industry, in THE
BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT : MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 292, 293 (Katja Franko
Aas & Mary Bosworth eds., 2013).
18

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 35–38 (1992).

19

Bowling, supra note 17, at 292.

20
In his book chapter on migration control in Spain, José Ángel Brandariz García illustrates
this precise dynamic, contrasting the rhetoric of criminal expulsion with the country’s need for migrant
labor. José Ángel Brandariz García, The Control of Irregular Migrants and the Criminal Law of the
Enemy, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE : CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 255 (Maria João Guia,
Maartje Van Der Woude & Joanne Van Der Leun eds., 2013). See also Maria João Guia,
Crimmigration, Securitisation, and the Criminal Law of the Crimmigrant, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND
JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 18 (Maria João Guia, Maartje Van Der Woude & Joanne
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While nations have the sovereign authority to control their own borders, the
imposition of criminal penalties for an irregular entry leads to various adverse
consequences. First, it attaches a stigma to migrants and the act of migration itself,
suggesting that noncitizens pose a kind of danger that must be deterred with the
imposition of a criminal punishment.21 Indeed, as criminal law ostensibly operates
to protect society from acts that are considered dangerous and/or socially
undesirable, 22 the prosecution and incarceration of migrants for the mere act of
crossing a border imbues the undocumented population with presumed criminality
and moral unworthiness.23 Additionally, the possibility of a criminal sanction leads
to greater marginalization of undocumented persons, in part due to fear of having
contact with law enforcement. This may lead irregular migrants to avoid seeking
help, even if they themselves are victims of crime. 24 Along these lines, this type of
criminalization may lead migrants to gravitate to underground economies and
networks, fueling more worrisome forms of criminal activity. 25 Furthermore,
noncitizens who are burdened with a criminal conviction for a migration-related act
face significant difficulties in seeking lawful status (including permanent residence)
at some point in the future. 26
The criminalization of unlawful entry has significant adverse consequences for
racial minorities, and reinforces deeply entrenched racial hierarchies. Given that
most of the persons who are charged with illegal entry are persons of color, 27 the
criminalization of the act reifies race-based stereotypes of criminality and
dangerousness. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández and Yolanda Vázquez have
explored how the history of crimmigration and its present-day iterations in the
Van Der Leun eds., 2013) (noting the “bipolarity in the way the immigrant is perceived . . . on the one
hand, as a necessary tool for the renovation and sustainability of the State and, on the other hand, as a
potential enemy whose presence requires a preventive reinforcement of security measures . . . .”).
21

César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457,
1458 (2013); cf. Amada Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism, Colorblindness, and
the Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 82, 92–93 (2016)
(describing how contact with the criminal justice system transforms Latino immigrants as “criminal
aliens”).
22

Stumpf, supra note 15, at 379.

23

Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 288 (2017)
(arguing that the “earned citizenship” frame requires noncitizens to prove their moral worth, and to
overcome the “original sin” of their initial immigration transgression).
24
Carmen Lussi, Políticas públicas e desigualdades na migração e refúgio, 26 PSICOLOGÍA
USP 136, 140 (2015).
25

Martinez & Slack, supra note 16, at 540.

26

Id.

27
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNING MIGRANTS INTO CRIMINALS: THE HARMFUL
IMPACT OF US BORDER PROSECUTIONS (2013) (“88 percent of defendants convicted of immigration
offenses in 2012 were Hispanic . . . .”).
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United States are shaped by animus towards racial minorities, disguised as objective
legal norms.28 Even in the absence of explicit animus on the part of individual
actors, the practices of the criminal-immigration system may be guided by implicit
bias or structural racism that leads certain groups to be disproportionately affected. 29
Indeed, in the current political moment, racial difference, combined with economic
vulnerability, make undocumented racial minorities easy targets for government
officials who wish to demonstrate that they are “tough” on immigration. 30
B. Policies in Comparative Perspective
Some countries treat unauthorized entry as a crime, situating it within a suite of
offenses that includes illegal reentry, the smuggling of migrants, or otherwise aiding
and abetting an unlawful entry. 31 In the United States, illegal entry first became a
crime in 1929.32 Initially, the misdemeanor of unlawful entry was punishable by a
year in prison and/or a fine of $1,000, and a subsequent unlawful entry could be
prosecuted as a felony. 33 In the present day, U.S. law continues to treat an initial
illegal entry, or “improper entry by [an] alien” as a misdemeanor.34 The U.S. Code
separately criminalizes “reentry of removed aliens,” imposing heightened penalties
upon persons who re-enter (or seek to do so) after being previously removed. 35 To
be sure, entry without authorization is not always treated as a crime under U.S. law,
since immigration officers may simply charge the individual with an administrative
violation of immigration law and commence removal proceedings, 36 without
referring the matter to federal prosecutors. Europe has largely followed the U.S.

28

See generally García Hernández, supra note 21; Yolanda Vazquez, Constructing
Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 599 (2015).
29

Doris Marie Provine & Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Criminalization of Immigrants as a Racial
Project, 27 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUSTICE 261, 266 (2011).
30

Id.

31

Lussi, supra note 24, at 140.

32

Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 299

(2010).
33
Stephen E. Gunkel & Ana-María González Wahl, Unauthorized Migrants and the (Il)Logic
of “Crime Control”: A Human Rights Perspective on the US Federal and Local State Immigration
Policies, 6 SOC. COMPASS 26, 28 (2012).
34

8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).

35

8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012).

36

Specifically, the noncitizen could be charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as being present without admission or parole, and thus subject to removal proceedings.
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model, with at least 17 of the European Union member states treating irregular
border crossings or irregular stays as a criminal offense.37
In recent years, however, the United States has (ignominiously) distinguished
itself with its aggressive pursuit of federal prosecutions of immigration-related
crimes. 38 A coordinated campaign among federal prosecutors and immigration
agents—named Operation Streamline—has led to robust prosecutions for unlawful
entry in key border areas.39 In Fiscal Year 2013, for example, close to 50,000 Border
Patrol apprehensions were referred for prosecution pursuant to Operation
Streamline. 40 In Fiscal Year 2016, 68,314 defendants were prosecuted for
immigration crimes before federal judges, representing 43 percent of all persons
prosecuted in that year for federal criminal offenses. 41 These practices have faced
significant criticism, even from federal judges who are required to impose jail
sentences on migrants who violate these laws, but who question the overall efficacy
of the initiative.42
Brazilian law, by contrast, does not treat an initial unlawful entry as a criminal
offense, but rather classifies the act as an administrative violation that can lead to
deportation from the country.43 This approach is somewhat surprising, given the
circumstances that gave rise to earlier legislation in the country. The statute that
preceded the 2017 Lei de Migração (Migration Law), the Estatuto do Estrangeiro
(Foreigner’s Statute) was introduced in 1980, during Brazil’s military dictatorship. 44
The law imposed significant restrictions on foreigners, placing them in a position of

37

Parkin, supra note 2, at 7.

38

Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135,
139–40 (2009); García Hernández, supra note 21, at 1472–73.
39

See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
STREAMLINE : MEASURING ITS EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING (2015).
40

Id. at 6.

41
Immigration Continues Lead Role in Federal Convictions, CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 28, 2017),
http://crimmigration.com/2017/03/28/immigration-continues-lead-role-in-federal-criminalprosecutions/.
42

JOANNA LYDGATE, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE : A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 4–7
(2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf.
43

Christian Gomes Bezerra dos Santos, A Criminalização da Imigração Irregular e os Direitos
Humanos, Os Casos Específicos de Brasil e Itália, 9 REVISTA DA FARN 101, 107 (2010). Notably,
proposed changes to the Brazilian criminal code would add various other immigration-related crimes.
Projeto de Lei do Senado no. 236, de 2012 (Novo Código Penal), arts. 452–57. These proposals have
been pending in the Brazilian Congress for several years, and have not gained political traction.
Moreover, aspects of the new immigration law—including the provision that rejects criminalization—
would legally undermine any efforts to impose a criminal penalty for unlawful entry.
44

Marcia Anita Sprandel, Migração e Crime: A Lei 6.815 de 1980, 12 REVISTA
INTERDISCIPLINARIA DA MOBILIDADE HUMANA 145 (2015).

2018]

POLITICS OF MIGRATION IN BRAZIL

155

inequality on issues of fundamental human rights.45 That law, by its very terms,
viewed immigration law as an instrument of national security, and sought to prevent
the entry of potentially subversive elements into Brazilian society. 46 In other words,
the law strongly implied that foreigners were a potential threat to domestic
security. 47 For that reason, the law prohibited noncitizens from engaging in political
activity in Brazil, including low-level actions such as attending demonstrations. 48
Despite the context of its enactment, the 1980 law avoided criminalizing
unlawful entry, as practiced by the United States. Over the years, however, Brazil
has incorporated provisions that criminalize certain migration-related acts. For
example, Brazilian law imposes criminal penalties on individuals who assist others
to enter unlawfully, and imposes a penalty on individuals who seek to re-enter the
country surreptitiously after expulsion from Brazil.49 The principal immigrationrelated crimes in Brazil are presented in the table below.

Table: Immigration-Related Crimes in Brazilian Law
Code Provision
Article 338, Criminal
Code

Article 309, Criminal
Code

Crime
Penalty
Re-entry into the national Imprisonment from 1–4
territory of a foreigner
years, with the possibility
who had been expelled
of a subsequent expulsion
after the sentence has
been served
Use by a foreigner of a
Imprisonment from 1–3
false name in order to
years, plus a fine;
enter or remain in the
Imprisonment from 1–4
national territory;
years, plus a fine
attribution of a false

45
Luiz Orencio Figueredo & João Henrique Zanelatto, Legislação e políticas públicas voltadas
à imigração no Brasil, 8 PASSAGENS: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE HISTÓRIA POLÍTICA E CULTURA
JURÍDICA 252, 262 (2016).
46
Id. at 147; Márcio Adriano Anselmo, Crimigração: A criminalização do estrangeiro no
Brasil e seus efeitos, 50 REVISTA DE INFORMAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA 143, 148 (2013).
47
Camila Lissa Asano & Pétalla Brandão Timo, A nova Lei de Migração no Brasil e os direitos
humanos, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG BRASIL (Apr. 17, 2017), https://br.boell.org/ptbr/2017/04/17/nova-lei-de-migracao-no-brasil-e-os-direitos-humanos. Along these lines, the 1980 law
limited the ability of foreigners to affiliate with unions and to participate in public demonstrations. Id.
See also Mateus de Oliveira Fornasier & Maiquel Angelo Dezordi Wermuth, Autoritarismo Versus
Redemocratização: Do Imigrante No Brasil, 15 REVISTA JURÍDICA CESUMAR 399, 405 (2015).
48
Lei no. 6,815 de 1980 (Estatuto do Estrangeiro), Art. 106, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 21.8.1980.
49

Gomes Bezerra dos Santos, supra note 43, at 106.
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Article 232A, Criminal
Code (introduced by
2017 law)

Article 125, Law 6815
of 1980 (Estatuto do
Estrangeiro) (recently
repealed, with passage
in 2017 of Lei de
Migração)

characteristic to a
foreigner in order to
promote his or her entry
into the national territory
Promote, by any means,
with the goal of
obtaining an economic
benefit, the illegal entry
of a foreigner into the
national territory or of a
Brazilian national into a
foreign country, or the
departure of a foreigner
from the national
territory in order to
illegally enter a foreign
country
Smuggle or harbor
foreigners; make a false
declaration in the process
of visa processing,
registration, alteration of
settlements,
naturalization, or when
obtaining a passport for
foreigners, laissezpasser, or, when
required, exit visa;
violations of other
restrictions on the
conduct of foreigners,
including engagement in
political activity

[Vol. 16:147

Imprisonment from 2–5
years, plus a fine, with
aggravating factors that
can enhance a sentence

Imprisonment from 1–5
years and, if the offender
is a foreigner, expulsion

Under Brazilian law, the Polícia Federal (Federal Police) has jurisdiction to
investigate these crimes and to refer them for prosecution before the federal courts.50
On paper, these offenses appear to mirror similar offenses that exist under U.S. law.
A critical distinction, however, is the negligible numbers of prosecutions under
Brazilian law. During a recent five-year period, there were only 129 total police
investigations for violations of Criminal Code Article 309, and 109 investigations
50

Anselmo, supra note 46, at 151.
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of possible violations of Article 308.51 To put this figure in context, in a year when
nearly 6 million foreigners entered Brazil, fewer than 100 individuals were even
investigated for using a false name or attempting to re-enter after expulsion.52 And
to provide additional context for the scope of immigration enforcement operations
in Brazil, in 2017 Brazil expelled just 375 noncitizens due to criminal convictions. 53
In 2016, the Federal Police effectuated only 79 expulsions, along with 147
deportations and 143 repatriations. 54
Brazil’s already limited appetite for the prosecution of immigration-related
crimes was nearly extinguished in May 2017, when the 1980 law was repealed and
a new immigration law was enacted. An immediate difference is noticeable in the
title, which replaces the more alienating “Estatuto do Estrangeiro” (Foreigner’s
Statute) with the more neutral “Lei de Migração” (Migration Law).55 A critical
provision of the new law is Article 3, which articulates principles that guide Brazil’s
migration policy, including the “non-criminalization of migration.”56 Consistent
with this value, the new law requires administrative authorities to notify irregular
migrants about the possibility of regularizing, and specifies that authorities must
permit 60 days for irregular migrants to do so. 57 In practice, this requires the
government to create conditions or mechanisms that would allow migrants to obtain
documents, instead of reflexively insisting on immigration documentation and
punishing those who lack them. 58 The new law also repealed Article 125 of the 1980
51

Id.

52

Id. at 150.

53
Renata Mariz, Brasil determinou expulsão de 375 estrangeiros em 2017, O GLOBO (Jan. 21,
2018),
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/brasil-determinou-expulsao-de-375-estrangeiros-em-201722311551.
54

POLÍCIA FEDERAL, UNIDADE PRESTADORA DE CONTAS, RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO DO EXERCÍCIO
DE 2016 (2017). Under Brazilian law, deportação (deportation) applies to persons who enter or remain
in irregular status; repatriação (repatriation) is similar to deportation, but is typically effectuated at a
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law, which imposed criminal penalties for a range of immigration-related conduct,
including smuggling or harboring foreigners, and making a false statement in
various immigration-related processes. 59 In its stead, the 2017 law introduced
Article 232A to the Brazilian Criminal Code, a more general provision relating to
the promotion of illegal entry for economic benefit.60 In these various regards, the
new immigration law in Brazil stands in stark contrast to the policies in other
countries, which have prioritized criminalization and deportation, as opposed to
regularization. 61
C. Other Criminal-Immigration Intersections in Brazil
Although the focus of this article is on Brazil’s treatment of unlawful entry,
some discussion of other criminal-immigration intersections provides context for
understanding the relevant legal and policy landscape.
Brazilian law does allow an expulsion process to commence if a non-citizen
commits a crime of sufficient gravity. Unlike the United States, which has
established a dizzying matrix of criminal removal categories, Brazilian law remains
somewhat vague regarding the types of crimes that can lead to expulsion, simply
noting that the “seriousness and the possibility of resocialization into the national
territory” is the relevant consideration.62 Additionally, even if a noncitizen has a
criminal conviction, Brazilian law forbids expulsion if the noncitizen has a spouse
residing in Brazil, a dependent child who is a Brazilian national, or if the noncitizen
arrived in Brazil before the age of 12 and has resided in the country since that time. 63
The law also provides discretionary protection for noncitizens who are at least 70
years of age, and who have lived in the country for more than 10 years. 64 These
provisions reveal that Brazilian law is more forgiving than its U.S. analog.
Additionally, unlike in the United States, noncitizens who serve time in custody
are not funneled automatically into the immigration removal system. 65 Nor is there
59
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(May
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a comprehensive effort to track down noncitizens with past convictions that could
potentially lead to expulsion. Although some number of these noncitizens are
ultimately expelled from the country, many are simply released from criminal
custody after serving their sentence. 66 This dynamic is telling, since a singular law
enforcement agency—the Federal Police—handles both routine criminal
investigations and also the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Thus far,
however, the Federal Police have not prioritized immigration enforcement as part of
their functions.67
Immigration detention is a theoretical possibility, but does not exist in practice
in any systematic way. Under Brazilian law, the Federal Police may detain an
individual in order to effectuate their removal from Brazil. 68 In reality, very few
immigrants are detained by the Federal Police, and there are no detention centers
exclusively for immigrants, such as those that exist in the U.S. and other countries. 69
On the contrary, when noncitizens are detained by the Federal Police in order to
effectuate a return to their country of origin, they are typically held in ad hoc spaces
at the airport.70 While immigration detention is nearly nonexistent, as described
more fully below, Brazil has embraced incarceration in its criminal justice system,
as reflected in a large and growing prison population. 71
Finally, because many law enforcement functions are concentrated in the
Federal Police, the concerns about “blurring of the lines” between distinct law
enforcement entities are not prominent in Brazil. Moreover, there are no initiatives
to delegate immigration functions to local authorities or law enforcement agencies.
One might argue, however, that the multiple functions handled by the Federal Police
(including immigration matters) could undermine trust with the public, particularly
those who are not Brazilian citizens. As noted above, however, the Federal Police
engages in minimal immigration enforcement.
66
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67
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Overall, a review of these criminal-immigration intersections in Brazil presents
a fairly benign picture. While federal authorities have the capacity to criminalize
migrants, they have done so infrequently. Moreover, the new immigration law
seems to signal a clear departure from criminalization. As with any new legislation,
however, it remains to be seen exactly how the new, progressive norms will be
interpreted, both by the Executive Branch (which issued implementing regulations
for the law in late 2017)72 and by the Federal Police, who are charged with various
immigration-related functions.
III. THE NON-CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION IN BRAZIL:
UNPACKING ITS ORIGINS
On the surface, the criminal-immigration policies in Brazil appear to represent
a significant departure from practices in the U.S. and in parts of Europe. In
particular, the explicit rejection of the criminalization of migrants is a counterpoint
to the burgeoning “crimmigration” nexus elsewhere. Additionally, the lackluster
enforcement of immigration laws is notable, when compared to the growing
enforcement budgets in other countries. Advocates for the human rights of migrants
might be inclined to commend Brazil for its seemingly humanitarian approach. A
closer examination reveals a more complex picture, and suggests that a range of
factors (themselves multi-layered) may have contributed to the current set of
policies.
A. Geopolitical Considerations
Brazil’s current approach to the criminalization of migration can be explained,
in part, through an examination of the country’s broader geopolitical objectives. The
relatively beneficent approach to migration control helps position Brazil as a
distinctive and independent global voice, and a leader among countries in the Global
South and in South America in particular. Moreover, the explicit embrace of the
human rights of migrants allows Brazil to elevate its profile within the United
Nations system, and to advocate effectively for the large number of Brazilian
émigrés residing in North America, Europe, and parts of Latin America. As both a
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving country, under recent presidents Brazil has
sought to adopt policies consistent with its own expectations for how Brazilian
nationals should be treated overseas.
Migration-related policies are often shaped by foreign relations objectives,
whether that goal is to forge stronger ties or to discredit adversaries, or to achieve
some other strategic, political, or ideological objective vis-à-vis other countries. 73
72
Decreto No. 9.199, de 20 de Novembro de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
21.11.2017.
73
This dynamic is especially visible in the context of refugee claims, and the signals that are
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In some cases, the receiving country’s objective is to modify or repair its own
reputation, thereby strengthening its position within the international community. 74
Brazil’s non-embrace of criminalization can be understood, in part, through this
lens. In addition to the new immigration law with its progressive norms, Brazil has
adopted other progressive measures in recent years relating to the humanitarian
protection of migrants. Most notably, Brazil has issued special humanitarian visas
to Haitians who wish to migrate to Brazil, and also to persons affected by the conflict
in Syria.75 Unlike other migrant-receiving countries, which have sought to block or
disincentivize refugee flows, Brazil has adopted a more flexible approach that
promotes regular entry. This allows Brazil to position itself as a regional and global
leader on issues of migration,76 and to strengthen its credentials relating to human
rights and humanitarian protection. 77
The progressive posture has allowed Brazil to stake a contrary position on a
key global issue, and to launch critiques, when it so desires, against wealthier
countries. For example, in 2009, during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva
(“Lula”), Brazil offered an amnesty to tens of thousands of undocumented persons
in the country. 78 On the same day that the amnesty was announced, Lula asked his
Ministry of Justice to raise the issue before the G8, “[in order] to show the leaders
of those large economies Brazil’s disagreement with the policies of the rich with
respect to immigrants. . . . Work and dignity for the immigrant is the response that
Brazil gives to the intolerance of the wealthy countries.” 79 Through these discourses,
Brazil has implicitly sought to advance a distinct position on migration for the
Global South, and to serve as the leader for that counter-position. During Lula’s
migrant. Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel, O redirecionamento da política externa brasileira para
imigrantes e refugiados: o caso da imigração haitiana no início do século XXI, 4 ESTUDOS
INTERNACIONAIS 27, 29 (2016).
74
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Refugiados, Resolução Normativa n. 17/2013.
As one pair of scholars has observed, Brazil’s embrace of more permissive immigration
policies reflects a competition, with Argentina in particular, for “ideological ‘post-neoliberal’ regional
leadership.” Diego Acosta Arcarazo & Andrew Geddes, Transnational Diffusion or Different Models?
Regional Approaches to Migration Governance in the European Union and Mercosur, 16 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 19, 39 (2014).
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presidency, Brazil also created a Special Secretariat for Human Rights, linked to the
Office of the President, and continued to strengthen its internal human rights
infrastructure.80 In 2009, Brazil signed the International Convention on the Rights
of Migrant Workers and their Families, and in the course of ratifying the instrument,
the Minister of External Relations noted the context of “increasingly severe entry
restrictions” and the corresponding need to strengthen efforts to protect the human
rights of migrants.81
This leadership on human rights issues is an important predicate for Brazil’s
ascension as a global power. Brazil has long been on the cusp of being a major
political force; the country has one of the largest economies in the world,
consistently ranking among the top ten in terms of gross domestic product. 82
Already a member of the BRICS alliance (comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa), Brazil has the potential to be an even more influential global
player.83 Additionally, its warmer embrace of migrants from other countries allows
Brazil to strengthen connections with other regions of the world, particularly SouthSouth relationships. The openings provided by a more flexible immigration policy
may also generate longer-term economic and political benefits for Brazil. 84
Furthermore, by embracing a more inclusive approach to migration—one
informed by human rights principles—Brazil may be seen as an emerging leader
within the community of nations, and can position itself for seats on prestigious
United Nations bodies, including the Security Council. This distinctive approach to
migration also helps lift Brazil’s reputation in the Inter-American System. In the
weeks after the passage of the new immigration law, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights issued a press release praising the new measure,
describing it as “modern legislation consistent with the principles of [Brazil’s]
Federal Constitution” and noting the measures that facilitate the regularization of
migrants.85 The communication also includes a quote from Luis Ernesto Vargas
Silva, a member of the Commission and its rapporteur on the rights of migrants, who

80
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Lula, 4 REVISTA DEBATES 107 (2010) (describing various developments linked to the Secretariat).
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congratulated Brazil for its “important advance for the protection of migrant
persons . . . .”86
To be sure, the Presidency of Michel Temer has generated uncertainty about
the trajectory of Brazil’s foreign policy. Although the Temer administration has
emphasized its embrace of “universal themes” such as peace and security, 87 others
have criticized Temer’s foreign policy as regressive, citing a move away from SouthSouth relationships and a lost opportunity to help mediate the conflict in
Venezuela.88 In the specific area of human rights, perspectives similarly diverge. 89
With respect to migration, the Temer government has been tested by the arrival of
thousands of Venezuelans refugees. Notwithstanding internal political pressures
and resource challenges, the Temer administration has publicly stated that it will not
close its doors to the Venezuelans.90 In this regard, the current government has
reaffirmed the importance of humanitarian migration policies.
Apart from managing these arriving migrants, Brazil is also justifiably
concerned about protecting its nationals overseas. Recent estimates suggest that
there are approximately 3 million Brazilian nationals who are residing outside of the
country.91 Beginning in the 1990s, these overseas Brazilians began to organize and
demand support from the state, which no doubt was cognizant of their economic and
86
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(Sept. 19, 2017), http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-planalto/noticias/2017/09/temer-politicaexterna-brasileira-abrange-temas-universais (last modified Feb. 26, 2018).
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electoral power.92 This ultimately led to the creation of an infrastructure within the
Brazilian government to attend to matters relating to émigrés. 93 Scholars have
argued that Brazil’s adoption of more liberal immigration policies can be explained
by this large Brazilian emigrant population residing in the United States and in
Europe. 94 One of the primary complaints registered by Brazilians overseas is the
lack of documentation. 95 Some of these migrants have experienced harsh
immigration enforcement tactics and criminalization in foreign countries; for
example, between 2002 and 2008, more than 37,000 Brazilians were deported back
to Brazil, primarily from the United States. 96 As noted above, the Brazilian
government has criticized wealthier countries’ treatment of migrants. Given its
concern regarding the experiences of Brazilian emigrants, it would be hypocritical
for Brazil to adopt the same oppressive practices. 97 Therefore, by rejecting
criminalization, Brazil is in a stronger position to criticize the practices of other
countries and to safeguard the well-being of its nationals overseas.98
B. The Size and Scope of Migration Flows to Brazil
One factor that necessarily shapes a country’s migration-related policies are the
nature and size of its incoming migrant flows. Brazil does receive a significant
number of foreigners each year: in 2016, the Federal Police recorded the entry of
nearly 5.9 million noncitizens. 99 Compared to the United States and some countries
in Europe, however, the relative presence of migrants is smaller. Brazil’s overall
population is approximately 206 million persons, and it is estimated that there are
about 1.2 million migrants in the country—less than 1% of the population. 100
92

Rocha Reis, supra note 79, at 50–51. Brazilians living overseas may vote only for the
President and Vice-President of Brazil.
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Eleitor no exterior,
http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor/copy_of_servicos/eleitor-no-exterior/votacao-no-exterior.
93

Rocha Reis, supra note 79, at 52–53.

94

Cf. Arcarazo & Freier, supra note 10, at 11.

95
MILESI & ANDRADE, supra note 78, at 8 (citing Roberto Marinucci, Clientes ou membros?
Participação de emigrantes brasileiros em grupos organizados, in TRAJETÓRIAS INTERROMPIDAS:
CIDADÃOS BRASILEIROS DEPORTADOS E NÃO ADMITIDOS 103 (Marinucci, Farias & Santin eds., 2009)).
96

MILESI & ANDRADE, supra note 78, at 10.

97

Arcarazo & Freier, supra note 10, at 13.

98
Luisa Feline Freier & Diego Acosta Arcarazo, South America’s Moves to Liberalize
Irregular Migration Are in Stark Contrast to the Punitive and Fatal Policies of the U.S. and Europe,
LSE US CENTRE (June 17, 2015), http://bit.ly/1JVf2jw.
99

Polícia Federal, supra note 54.

100
Asano & Timo, supra note 47. It is unclear whether this figure includes foreign-born persons
who ultimately obtained Brazilian citizenship. Assuming that’s the case, the number of noncitizens
currently residing in Brazil may actually be lower. One source from 2011 estimated the foreign-born
population to be in the range of 600,000 to 1 million persons. Rocha Reis, supra note 79, at 59. See

2018]

POLITICS OF MIGRATION IN BRAZIL

165

Moreover, although economic growth in Brazil made it attractive for migrants
several years ago, recent challenges have diminished Brazil’s appeal as a destination
for labor migration. 101 Brazil has experienced an uptick in refugee flows, and in
recent years, received approximately 30,000 asylum applications per year; prior to
2011, the country received only about 1,000 asylum applications annually. 102
Compare this to the United States, where well over 100,000 asylum applications are
docketed each year.103
Additionally, while estimates regarding the undocumented population in Brazil
are unreliable, one study from 2010 estimated that population to be in the range of
around 200,000 persons.104 A 2008 source quoted an official government estimate
of 180,000, and contrasted that figure to a 600,000 estimate provided by an advocacy
organization.105 Given the aforementioned economic downturn, it is likely that the
current undocumented population in Brazil is closer to the lower end of that range.
Policy makers in the United States face a much larger unauthorized population,
in the range of 11–14 million persons. To be sure, restrictive migration policies do
not necessarily correlate with larger (or specific) numbers of foreigners, given the
complex historical and sociological factors—including questions of race—that
shape responses to migrants.106 Nevertheless, it is interesting to contemplate
whether criminalization of migration could surface in Brazil, should significantly
increased migration flows introduce changes or exert other pressures on the
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country.107 Alternatively, one could argue that an ex ante set of conditions,
objectives, or values relating to international migration (including those described
in this article) could mitigate or prevent such tensions. Brazil is poised to be a
perfect case study, because it is likely to face growing migrant streams in the future,
and has just recently chosen to reject the criminalization of migrants.
Although the overall presence of migrants is smaller compared to other
countries, the incoming international migration flows are nevertheless significant
and visible in large cities, where migrants tend to be concentrated. São Paulo and
surrounding areas have attracted migrants from across the globe, and other cities and
towns, particularly those near borders or ports of entry, have become host to
significant numbers of foreigners.108 In urban centers, there are ongoing
conversations about services for migrant communities and best practices for
integration.109 Large cities, especially São Paulo, also wield immense political and
legislative influence, which would suggest that serious grievances about migration
could be addressed through law reform, including the imposition of criminal
penalties for irregular migration. Legislators from urban areas generally supported
the new law, and have not advocated for this approach—perhaps because the
migration flows have not triggered significant public concern. In fact, the legislator
who formally introduced the new law was Aloysio Nunes Ferreira,110 an influential
senator from São Paulo who Temer appointed to serve as Minister of Foreign
Affairs.111
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C. A History of Flexible and Integrative Policies, Informed by Civil Society
Brazil’s current approach to irregular migration is likely conditioned by a
legacy of migration-related policies in the country’s history, which evidence a
flexible and integrative approach to migration management. A key piece of this
history is the country’s relatively frequent embrace of legalization initiatives. Since
1980, the Brazilian government has approved four separate laws that allow for the
“regularization” of undocumented migrants in the country. These “amnesties” were
conferred in 1981, 1988, 1998, and 2009.112 In the aggregate, they allowed for the
regularization of nearly 150,000 migrants.113 According to observers, a range of
factors affected participation in these processes, including lack of confidence or trust
on the part of the migrants, as well as bureaucratic hurdles such as required
paperwork and deadlines. 114
Another factor that explains the more flexible approach to irregular migration
is Brazil’s engagement with its regional neighbors in coordinating migration
policies.115 One of the longer-term objectives of these partnerships is the right to
free circulation for migrants within the region. 116 Under the terms of the 2002
Mercosur Residence Agreement, which went into effect in 2009, nationals of
Mercosur Member States (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and soon
Bolivia)117 and Associate Member States (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru,
and Suriname) are permitted to reside and work in another member state for a period
of two years, provided they can establish their citizenship and demonstrate a clean
criminal record.118 After two years, the permit holder may seek lawful permanent
residence in the host country. 119 Brazil also may have been influenced by similar
pieces of progressive migration legislation that were enacted in Argentina (2004)
112
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2771/98, and Lei No. 11,961/2009.
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and Ecuador (2008).120 Although both of these measures encountered significant
challenges, 121 they are emblematic of a consistent regional effort to stake out a more
accommodating approach to migration. This flexibility involving regional migrants
likely shapes the government’s posture towards unlawful entry, since the Mercosur
Agreement provides yet another pathway to regularization.
This more flexible and integrative posture towards migrants is also explained,
in part, through the active engagement of civil society actors in immigration policy
discussions and decision-making. For example, Brazil’s National Council on
Immigration has representatives from civil society, 122 as does its National
Committee on Refugees, which makes decisions on refugee claims. 123 In the leadup to the passage of the new immigration law, key civil society organizations
advocated before both the Brazilian government and international bodies,
emphasizing the human right to migrate. 124 Along with representatives of
government agencies, these civil society organizations participated in conversations
regarding themes for the new law and possible provisions to include. Over many
years, the Brazilian government has allowed these entities to have a meaningful role
in migration-related decision making. The migrant-friendly values they advocate
have unquestionably shaped the recent trajectory of Brazilian immigration policy.
D. Historical Considerations, National Identity, and Race
As mentioned, the 1980 law positioned noncitizens as potentially subversive
elements within Brazilian society. In a way, that law ran counter to a deep historical
current: Brazil’s self-conception as a country of immigrants.125 Throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Brazil received waves of migrants, largely from
Europe (including Germany, Italy, and Poland), Asia (particularly Japan and Korea),

120
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and other parts of Latin America.126 The Brazilian government affirmatively
welcomed (and even recruited) many of these groups of migrants, for different
purposes. For example, Brazil sought out migrants to settle more rural areas of its
territory, and needed a labor force after the end of slavery in the late 19th century. In
the post-independence history of Brazil, immigrants have been hailed for
“improving an imperfect nation” through their presence and contributions.127 Over
the years, this self-conception of a nation improved by immigrants has remained
strong, and arguably shapes immigration policy decisions and the nation’s level of
tolerance to immigrants.128 Indeed, even persons not born abroad often embrace
their ancestral heritage. 129
Perhaps the most relevant historical factor, however, is the 1980 migration law,
which explicitly linked migration and national security. As noted above, this
foundational immigration law emerged during Brazil’s military dictatorship, and
sought to undercut potentially subversive influences on Brazil. Since emerging from
this military dictatorship, Brazil has made efforts (seen in various aspects of its legal
system) to counter the legacy of the military dictatorship by explicitly embracing
human rights norms.130 Although some governmental institutions have been slow to
change, many within government and civil society are committed to the project of
constructing a society guided by human rights norms. This impulse—of eliminating
the remnants of the military dictatorship—is embedded in progressive law reform
efforts in Brazil. 131 A perfect example is the new immigration law, which was
framed as a way to undo another legacy of the military dictatorship. As one pair of
observers has noted, the establishment of a new legal framework will allow Brazil
to repay the historical debt occasioned by the more restrictive 1980 law.132 In an
effort to promote more inclusive governance, law reform efforts now also include
voices from civil society; as noted above, these representatives have also had a
126
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moderating influence on criminalization tendencies, by reinforcing the importance
of human rights.
To be sure, Brazil’s self-conception as an immigrant nation is deeply informed
by questions of race and class. In the 19th century, the Brazilian government
affirmatively recruited European migrants in order to “whiten” society given the
large numbers of slaves who had recently been emancipated. 133 Even among Asian
migrants, Japanese migrants were welcomed, whereas Chinese migrants were turned
away due to racialized and class-based conceptions of inferiority. 134 Although Brazil
received migrants from the Middle East throughout the 20th century, and some
experienced discrimination,135 many have assimilated within Brazil’s racial
hierarchy as “white.” (For example, Brazil’s embattled president, Michel Temer, is
the son of Lebanese immigrants who immigrated to Brazil in 1925).136
International migration flows to Brazil are undergoing a demographic shift,
such that many of the present-day migrants hail from the Global South, including
Haiti, Senegal, the Congo, Bolivia, and other countries. 137 This stands in contrast to
Brazilian policies from the early twentieth century, which effectively denied entry
to Black migrants, including Black Americans. 138 The current migration pathway
between Haiti and Brazil is particularly strong, and can be traced to Brazil’s
contribution to the UN effort in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. 139 This led to
stronger ties between the two countries and growing migration flows. Eventually,
Brazil’s National Council on Immigration issued resolutions, authorizing the
issuance of “humanitarian visas” for Haitian nationals, and regularizing those
133
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Haitians who had entered the country surreptitiously. 140 As of 2016, approximately
80,000 Haitian nationals were residing in Brazil, 141 though a significant number have
left in recent years, seeking opportunities elsewhere.
Brazil has an immensely complex history of race relations, but the
subordination of Black Brazilians has been a consistent thread in Brazilian history. 142
As these migration flows from the Global South persist, and as Black migrants
continue to arrive in the country, they may test Brazil’s immigrant-friendly identity
and its apparent tolerance of irregular migration. Stated differently: is Brazil truly
welcoming of all migrants, or does it want only migrants of a particular color or
socioeconomic class? Migrants from Africa and even some from other parts of Latin
America have experienced prejudice, discrimination, and exploitative working
conditions, and have been the target of anti-immigrant public protests.143 Some of
these migrants have limited professional qualifications and difficulty with the
language, making them even more susceptible to mistreatment.144 Black migrants
in Brazil have even suffered physical assaults (including shootings) motivated by
xenophobia.145
The experience of these migrants of color in the coming years will shed light
on the outer bounds of Brazil’s immigrant-friendly identity. Should the Brazilian
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state wish to limit the entry of certain migrants of color—or exert control over those
already in the country—criminalization may resurface as a possibility. 146
E. Criminal Justice Priorities in Brazil
Another way to understand Brazil’s non-embrace of migrant criminalization is
to examine the country’s criminal justice system itself. Violence and public security
are top priorities, and law enforcement resources are directed at curbing that
epidemic. Although noncitizens have been the subject of criminal prosecutions, the
vast majority of them entered the criminal justice system through the drug trade. To
the extent there are concerns about immigrant criminality in Brazil, they appear to
be linked to the role that noncitizens play in transporting narcotics.
In recent decades, Brazil has struggled with the growing influence of criminal
organizations, particularly in large urban centers such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
Belo Horizonte, and Recife. Crime consistently ranks as the most pressing public
concern.147 Fear of crime is omnipresent, leading to public support for harsh,
sometimes illegal responses.148
Societal violence, one of the principal sequelae of this criminal activity, is now
seen as a significant public health challenge for Brazil—one that produces physical
injuries, psychological harm, and diminished quality of life. 149 Brazil’s epidemic of
violence has also resulted in staggering economic costs, in the form of “expenditure
on police, prisons, private security, public health, and loss of human capital [as well
as] personal loss from robbery and theft . . . .”150 These deeply entrenched concerns
about public violence and insecurity within communities have led to heightened
criminal penalties, robust law enforcement efforts and therefore a growing prison
population in nearly all Brazilian states. 151 Official statistics from summer 2016
revealed that Brazil had more than 726,000 prisoners, which corresponds to nearly
146
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353 prisoners for every 100,000 persons.152 This means that Brazil has the third
largest prison population in the world, behind the United States and China. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Brazil’s robust crime-fighting efforts have disproportionately
affected poor communities of color, particularly Afro-descendants. More than half
of Brazil’s prison population is comprised of young adults between the ages of 18
and 29, and 64 percent of prisoners are black. 153 The size of this prison population
and the disproportionate impact on underprivileged minorities is yet another reason
why Brazil’s non-punitive approach to irregular migration is so surprising.
That said, some number of migrants do end up in Brazil’s increasingly punitive
criminal justice system. According to recent statistics, approximately 3,200
foreigners are housed in the Brazilian prison system, representing less than 1 percent
of the overall prison population in Brazil. 154 The overwhelming majority of these
persons have been convicted of drug-related offenses.155 According to the Federal
Public Defender’s office, approximately 90 percent of these prisoners are drug
“mules,” typically persons who had transported illegal drugs. 156 Many of these
prisoners were likely sentenced pursuant to the 2006 Lei de Drogas, which enhanced
penalties for drug trafficking, increasing sentences to five to fifteen years.157 In this
context, some migrants are impacted by policies of criminalization, though not
necessarily because of their immigration status. Although there are also some

152
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reports of cases where Federal Police officers have targeted migrants for selective
policing, these reports tend to be episodic in nature. 158
Although immigrants in Brazil have been linked to drug trafficking, there is not
widespread preoccupation about their dangerousness to the community, nor is there
urgency regarding removing these individuals once they have served their sentence.
Indeed, some of these prisoners—particularly those who had been granted parole
before the official end of their sentence—find themselves in a legal limbo, lacking
legal status, but waiting (sometimes years) for the formal expulsion process to run
its course. 159 In general, discourses relating to public security in Brazil do not
foreground threats posed by foreigners. 160 This stands in contrast to the experience
in other countries, where growing societal preoccupation about criminality has
coincided with concerns regarding specific migrant groups.161
External observers might offer another reason for the existing criminal justice
priorities in Brazil: the country, unlike the United States and some in Europe, has
not yet experienced a major foreign terrorist event. 162 Such an event might pierce
the public consciousness, linking migration policy with national security, and
thereby result in more aggressive border control and criminalization. This line of
thinking, while logical, ignores the historical and present-day circumstances of
Brazil.163 First, concerns about international terrorism have weighed heavily in
recent years, as Brazil has hosted two major international sporting events: the World
Cup (2014) and the Summer Olympic Games (2016). For both of these events,
Brazil prepared for the possibility of terrorist activity. 164 Although both events
158
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occurred without incident, the Brazilian state—and its society—has felt the weight
of a possible terrorist incident, such that in 2016 the Brazilian Congress passed a
new law to prevent and combat terrorism. 165
Moreover, concerns about terrorist activity and religious extremism do feature
in Brazilian political discourse. Conservative media outlets have reported on
Federal Police investigations of Brazilian nationals suspected of connections to
extremist groups.166 Additionally, in recent years, as the country has contemplated
changes to its criminal and immigration laws, groups within Brazilian society have
warned of the dangers posed by foreigners, including the possible influence of
Islamic extremism. Although such views are not widespread, Brazilian society has
been forced to engage with these questions, at least on some level. 167 In other words,
Brazilian government officials have contemplated the possibility of terrorist attacks,
but have not opted for repressive immigration controls as a counter-terrorism tool.
Finally, as a practical matter, immigration-related functions are just a sliver of
the broad mandate of the Federal Police. 168 Some observers have suggested that the
agency simply does not have the capacity to properly handle immigration matters,
given their focus on drug and wildlife trafficking, smuggling, and white-collar
crime. 169 High-level Federal Police officials have even suggested that the agency be
relieved of administrative policing functions, including those relating to
migration. 170 Along these lines, in recent years, the Federal Police has subcontracted
immigration screening functions at airports to a third party, prompting criticism from
observers about lack of training and oversight of workers.171 The resources of the
Federal Police are indeed limited, and would be inefficiently allocated in patrolling
the country’s 15,000 kilometers of borders, given all of the other demands on the

165
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agency.172 Additionally, the agency has experienced budget reductions in recent
years, as the Brazilian government as a whole struggles through a fiscal crisis. 173
IV. THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION INTERSECTIONS IN BRAZIL
Demographic, historical, geopolitical, and policy considerations have likely
shaped, to varying degrees, the current policies in Brazil relating to the
criminalization of migrants. The immigrant-friendly policies of the Brazilian state
are commendable, but may shield other concerns, and may ultimately prove to be
ephemeral. Other analytical lenses suggest that while migration itself is not
criminalized, the Brazilian state has generated hardships for migrants, through both
acts and omissions. Furthermore, conditions in the future may change the trajectory
of Brazil’s migration policy.
One immediate concern is the volatile political climate in Brazil in the
aftermath of the 2018 Presidential election. As of this writing, Jair Bolsonaro, often
described as a Trump-like figure, is poised to assume the presidency after prevailing
in the October 2018 election.174 Bolsonaro was one of the few Senators to openly
criticize the new Migration Law, tweeting in April 2017 that the legislation “could
bring chaos to Brazil.”175 Migration policy under a Bolsonaro presidency would
likely shift, but the nature and scope of any change remains quite uncertain.
Although a repeal of the May 2017 law would require an act of Congress, the new
administration could simply choose not to fully implement the law.
A related concern is the persistence of the migration flows from Venezuela,
which have contributed to conflicts in border areas, and ongoing discussions about
Brazil’s international obligations. In August 2018, after an alleged scuffle between
a local merchant and some Venezuelans, a group of residents in the state of Roraima
attacked and set fire to migrant encampments, driving more than 1,000 Venezuelans
back across the border.176 On the whole, the Brazilian public generally favors the
protection of Venezuelans, but not overwhelmingly so: a recent public opinion poll
revealed that 45 percent of Brazilians oppose closing the borders, 30 percent favor
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the move, and 25 percent have no opinion.177 Bolsonaro has called for the creation
of refugee camps in border areas, emphasizing that Brazil cannot be an open-borders
country.178 The shifting political winds in Brazil, in combination with the increasing
strain of the Venezuela crisis, may shape Brazil’s migration policies in unpredictable
ways.
Another area for concern is the growing influence of the private prison industry
in Brazil. Historically, prisons in Brazil have been government-run, but recent
events—including a spate of prison riots—have raised questions about the
government’s ability to effectively manage the prison system. And indeed, a handful
of Brazilian states have entered into contracts with private prison companies. 179 As
the United States’ experience clearly demonstrates, the need to maintain revenues
for private prison corporations contributes to efforts to further criminalize
migrants.180 Indeed, it is telling that the vast majority of individuals who are
prosecuted under Operation Streamline are incarcerated in private detention
facilities.181 Should private prisons continue to grow in number and influence in
Brazil, there may be a spillover effect on immigration policy and criminalization.
This trend is worthy of continued monitoring.
Moreover, although Brazil may have chosen to reject the explicit rhetoric of
criminalization, the state is arguably deploying other approaches to exert control
over migrants. These devices also limit the ability of migrants to enjoy productive,
autonomous lives. Even in the absence of direct physical control, the state can assert
its power in indirect ways. This lens of analysis allows us to see the quintessential
criminal-immigration intersections as part of a broader continuum of state
practices.182
Notwithstanding the promising language in the new law, and the generally low
enforcement of immigration-related crimes, law enforcement activities in Brazil
have come under some scrutiny. During the Ebola epidemic, reports surfaced of
African migrants in Brazil experiencing abusive treatment and discrimination by law
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enforcement.183 Another example comes from 2016, after Venezuelan migrants
crossed the border into Brazil seeking refuge, and began to cluster in the northern
Brazilian state of Roraima. In late 2016, in an incident that garnered significant
public attention, federal police officers nearly deported approximately 450 of these
Venezuelans, including individuals who had presented formal refugee claims. 184
Fortunately, intervention by the Brazilian courts prevented these deportations from
taking place. 185 Along these lines, observers have also criticized the treatment of
asylum-seekers who arrive at Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo,
including the fact that they are sometimes detained in an ad hoc fashion for indefinite
periods of time. 186 The aforementioned prosecution of drug mules is another way
that the state exerts control over noncitizens. 187
Another way in which noncitizens in Brazil experience mistreatment is
arguably through the perpetuation of their economic vulnerability. As noted above
in the context of Haitians, in recent years, the National Council of Immigration in
Brazil has issued resolutions that have regularized thousands of migrants who were
residing in Brazil without formal legal status. The Council is a unique body, housed
within the Executive Branch, but comprised of representatives of different federal
ministries, as well as members of civil society (including non-profits and unions). 188
The very language of the Council resolutions reveal that they passed on the heels of
strong lobbying from employers and industries that had hired these immigrant
workers.189 These businesses argued that their industries depended on the migrant
workforce. Therefore, the justification for their regularization of status was to allow
them to continue supporting these industries. 190 Although the newly acquired
immigration status did not require employment with a specific company, in practice,
many of these migrants may find themselves depending on employers to navigate
complex immigration process or for different types of social support.
Ironically, the Brazilian state has also enhanced the vulnerability of the
migrants through negligence of their post-arrival needs. One of the most consistent
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critiques of Brazilian migration policy is the lack of efforts by the federal
government to assist migrants with access to services and with their general
integration into Brazilian society. 191 In other words, while Brazil has adopted
welcoming immigration policies, it has failed to pair those policies with the
infrastructure needed to support the arriving migrants.192 By failing to provide these
support services, the Brazilian state has placed migrants in circumstances of extreme
precarity, rendering them vulnerable to exploitation and preventing them from living
full and independent lives.
Along these lines, although Brazil has championed human rights principles in
public fora and through its progressive new immigration law, observers have
emphasized the “contrast between Brazil’s formal commitment to liberal democratic
norms and the violation of the basic rights of so many of its citizens.” 193 In other
words, while the government may embrace progressive principles through its
rhetoric and written legislation, the reality on the ground suggests contrary behavior,
or at a minimum, that the progressive norms have not trickled down to the level of
public officials who actually implement the law.194
Even accounting for these complexities, Brazil is at a unique historical moment,
with a recent history of inclusive immigration policies, now punctuated by a new
immigration law. Developments in the coming months and years will determine
whether the policy of embracing migration (and rejecting criminalization of
migration) is illusory, or whether it represents a permanent normative shift in
country-level migration policy. Several factors will help determine the integrity of
this position, including the following: (1) whether Brazil chooses to develop a solid
infrastructure for immigrant integration, to buttress its welcoming rhetoric; (2)
whether the new policies embraced by Brazil are adopted by other countries,
particularly in South America; (3) whether support for this approach will remain
strong after the 2018 election, or whether a Bolsonaro presidency will stall or even
reverse the progressive turn in Brazilian migration policy; (4) whether significantly
elevated migrant flows, including a steady stream of arrivals from Venezuela, along
191
Asano & Timo, supra note 47 (describing difficulties that migrants face relating to obtaining
documentation, discrimination, and social integration).
192
Bógus & Fabiano, supra note 101, at 135 (“[A]lthough Brazil is internationally recognized
as a welcoming country, due to its ability to provide shelter to different cultures, refugees encounter
many difficulties in integrating into Brazilian society.”).

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, ONE IN FIVE : THE CRISIS IN BRAZIL’S PRISONS AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (2010). FitzGerald & Cook-Martín make similar observations about
Brazilian immigration policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and observe how the country
embraced its reputation as a “racial democracy” while seeking to exclude various groups of undesirable
migrants. See generally FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTÍN, supra note 133.
193

194
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, ONE IN FIVE : THE CRISIS IN BRAZIL’S PRISONS AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27 (2010) (“Successive Brazilian governments have a long history of
implementing reforms at the formal level, while maintaining policies, practices and institutions that
rested on a denial of basic rights.”).

180

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 16:147

with other poor migrants of diverse backgrounds, will generate heightened tensions
about migrants and their impact on Brazilian society; (5) whether pathologies in its
criminal justice system will undermine the benevolent posture towards receiving
migrants; and (6) whether relevant government actors, particularly the Federal
Police, embrace these norms.
Ultimately, many of these factors could be explored and addressed through a
cohesive migration policy that is developed at the government level, in collaboration
with local entities and also foreign powers. To its credit, Brazil has contemplated
such a dialogue, and describes the contours for future policy development in its May
2017 law.195 Additionally, in November 2017, the Brazilian government issued
implementing regulations for the law. 196 While the regulations are extensive,
observers have criticized specific provisions for their inconsistency with the letter
and spirit of the law.197 Discussions regarding the law’s implementation, including
the regulations, will undoubtedly continue in the months and years to come.
For Brazil’s policies to persist, its government and society must be able to resist
the narrative that equates foreigners with dangerousness and criminality, and
continue to advance one that views the reception of migrants as a basic obligation
of states. Unique historical and positional factors in Brazil may indeed allow Brazil
to retain its relatively benevolent posture towards immigrants. And if this approach
succeeds, over time, it may emerge as a lasting and effective counterpoint in global
discourses regarding migration.
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